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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we discuss the ethics of genetics-based talent identification programmes 
in sports. We discuss  the validity and reliability of the tests and the claims made by 
direct to consumer companies, before presenting a range of ethical issues concerning 
child-parent/guardian relations raised by these tests, which we frame in terms of 
parental/guardian duties, children’s rights, and best interests.  We argue that greater 
ethical emphasis needs to be put on the parental decision on the wellbeing on the child 
going forward, not on ex post justifications on the basis of good and bad 
consequences. Best Interests decisions, made by a third party seem to comprise both 
subjective and objective elements but only a holistic approach can do justice to these 
questions by addressing the wellbeing of the child in a temporal manner and taking 
into account the child’s perspective on its wellbeing. Such decisions must address 
wider questions of what a good (sports)parent ought do to help the child flourish and 
how to balance the future-adult focus necessary to nurture talent with the wellbeing of 
the child in the present. We conclude that current genetic tests for ‘talent’ do not 
predict aptitude or success to any significant degree and are therefore only marginally 
pertinent for talent identification. Claims that go beyond current science are culpable, 
and attempt to exploit widespread but naïve perceptions of the efficacy of genetics 
information to predict athletic futures.  Sports physicians and health care 
professionals involved in sport medicine should therefore discourage the use of these 
tests. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
School playgrounds are the traditional sites of basic talent identification systems 
where team captains select, one by one, from the most to the least able and desirable 
teammates.  Nowadays, it seems, we should instead ask our children for a cheek swab 
to genetically test their athletic potential. It is not clear that there are gains in efficacy 
despite advances in science and technology, since questions of reliability and validity 
remain.  We critically discuss here the conceptual and ethical questions arising from 
the use of genetically-based approaches to athletic talent identification.  
 
2. WHAT DO GENETIC TESTS FOR ATHLETIC TALENT IDENTIFY? 
Genetic polymorphisms are defined as naturally occurring variations (usually at a 
single base pair of DNA, although they can involve longer stretches of DNA), which 
involve one of two or more variants of a particular DNA sequence (NCBI definition). 
If occurring at a single nucleotide polymorphism (as is the case for most Performance 
Enhancing Polymorphisms, or PEPs), they are called a single nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP). Most of these variations are neutral (i.e. they do not change the 
encoded aminoacid, or for which there  is no established phenotype), but some 
correlate with susceptibility to disease, drug response, or with other phenotypes (e.g. 
the distribution of muscle fiber types). Recent years have witnessed the rise of a 
market in direct-to-consumer (DTC) tests to identify children’s athletic talents with a 
focus of testing for SNPs. In the USA alone there are at least seven companies that 
currently sell DTC-genetic tests for sports performance or related traits targeting 
children.(28,33). There are companies also based in the UK such as “DNA Fit”, 
which sells “genetic information for fitness and nutrition” (although the target here 
seems to be adults). Coaches, trainers and parents are the target populations. The tests 
are relatively cheap ranging from under $100 to about $1,000, depending on the 
number of SNPs being tested. 
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Beyond the commercial sector there are government-sponsored programmes to 
cultivate future Olympic Champions have taken a genetic turn: for example, China’s 
nation-wide boarding schools for talent identification,(20) and Uzbekistan’s national 
genetic screening programmes endorsed by National Olympic Committee.(30) 
 
While most DTC companies are US-based their services are offered globally. As a 
predominantly an on-line international market, it is difficult to regulate.  The UK 
Human Genetics Commission (dismantled in 2012) and the European Society of 
Human Genetics recommend that genetic tests be provided with appropriate genetic 
counseling.(23,21) In Europe, tests for talent are potentially in breach of Council of 
Europe Bioethics Convention article 12, which sets out a strict therapeutic or 
preventative rationale for genetic tests.(8) In the US, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics published 
guidelines in 2013 on the genetic testing of minors strongly discouraging the use of 
DTC- testing because of “lack of oversight on test content, accuracy and 
interpretation”. (27) Specifically in the context of sport, the NHMRC of Australia has 
released guidelines in November 2013 discouraging DNA testing for talent 
identification in sport.(24), and in November 2015 The British Journal of Sport 
Medicine also recently released a  joint consensus statement clearly stating that “With 
regard to predicting future sporting performance, the scientific foundation is 
extremely limited and largely non-existent. There is concern among the scientific 
community that the current level of knowledge is being misrepresented implicitly for 
commercial purposes.” (32: 1490) 
  
Talent identification is seen an effective first step on the path to athletic success.. On 
the basis of the results of these tests parents and coaches may identify, plan and invest 
in the children’s future. Perhaps surprisingly the central concept “talent” is far from 
clearly mapped or universally agreed upon. 
In the literature on talent identification the most widely cited text is Baker and Cobley  
(3: p.3 ) who in their review of evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of 
contemporary systems for identifying and developing talent in sport define talent as:  
 
“the quality (or qualities) identified at an earlier time that promotes (or predicts) 
exceptionality at a future time.”(3)  
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Consistent with the above they refer to “talent identification” (p. 5) as the  
 
“process of recognising and selecting players, through a series of testing and 
subjective assessment procedures, who show potential to excel at a more 
advanced level of competition” (3) 
 
There are at least two conceptual problems with these definitions.  The first does not 
track common linguistic usage.  Thus, for example, the Oxford English Dictionary, 
defines talent as a “natural aptitude or skill”. Secondly, Baker and co-authors link 
talent to future as opposed to present ability.  In addition, there are two problematic 
assumptions that underpin empirical research and applied practices in sport talent 
identification (and its development) that are recognized by Baker and co-authors. The 
first one is that talent is identifiable and quantifiable. The second is that adult 
performance can be predicted by earlier performance through specific ‘markers’ such 
as speed tests, power tests, or genetic markers.  In the case of genetic-based talent 
identification, the dominant assumption is that athletic excellence can be traced back 
to specific genetic polymorphisms.  
 
3. ARE GENETICS-BASED TALENT IDENTIFICATION PROGRAMMES 
SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND? 
 
Genetic variations or performance enhancing polymorphisms (PEP) have increasingly 
been identified in recent years (25, 9, 26). With costs of DNA sequencing 
dramatically decreasing, a growth trend is reasonably predictable. Despite the 
increasing complexity and sophistication of genetic science in sport,, the assumption 
that athletic excellence can be traced back to specific genetic polymorphisms is a 
remarkably simplistic assumption. Most of these tests are based of genome wide 
association studies (GWAS) that merely detect statistical links between variants of a 
particular genetic polymorphism and a phenotype. They cannot prove that the gene 
variant is casually related to, e.g a disease, nor does they tell researchers anything 
about the function of the gene and how it may be involved in the condition: a 
statistical association does not entail an association of any clinical utility.(18) In 
addition, in the case of genetic testing for talent, there is a further problem of 
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transferability. PEPs are identified on elite athletes and their significance is then 
extrapolated to a completely different population, i.e. children often of a different 
ethnic background.(11) 
The test for the alfa-actinin 3 polymorphism (ACTN3) exemplifies many of 
the problems inherent in these genetics-based talent-identification tests.  The ACTN3 
gene codes for the actin-binding protein alfa-actinin, where actin is an integral 
component of the protein super-structure that generates contractile force within 
muscle fibers. Polymorphisms in ACTN3 are thought to contribute to the heritability 
of fiber-type distribution in muscle, where the Type I are slow-twitch fibres that 
metabolise aerobically and are used in endurance races, while Type II are fast-twitch 
fibres that metabolise anaerobically, and are used in sprints.(25,34) The test for 
‘ACTN3 Sports Gene’ is marketed as a genetic ‘Power/Speed performance test’, with 
the aim to give ‘parents and coaches early information on their child’s genetic 
predisposition for success in team or individual speed/power or endurance sports’.(2) 
Genetic scientists give no support to this bold assertion.  While tests for 
ACTN3 variants claim to assess the predisposition to athletic ability and prowess, the 
ACTN3 gene accounts for only 2% of total variance in muscle performance.(9) The 
rest of the variation is determined by a wide range of genetic and environmental 
factors, only a fraction of which are understood.(9) Moreover, the fact that there is a 
higher frequency of ACTN3 polymorphism in elite sprinters does not allow prediction 
of athletic performance, as muscle performance is merely one component of athletic 
performance.(19) Moreover, as the systematic review and meta-analysis by Ma and 
co-authors demonstrates (18), only two statistically significant associations have been 
demonstrated between the angiotensin I converting enzyme and endurance events, and 
the ACTN3 association with power performance. Notwithstanding these, other 
polymorphisms offered by the DTC companies fail to reach statistical association, let 
alone clinical utility or predictive power. In addition, what we know so far on the 
genetic basis of sport performance has been generated using relatively small cohorts 
of less than 300 individuals.(9) 
 
In his classification of DTC-genetic tests, Caulfield (2011) establishes a continuum 
between “marginally pertinent”, “vaguely predictive”, and “clearly preposterous”.(6) 
At best DTC-genetic tests for talent identification may be classified as ‘marginally 
pertinent’ because despite advances in the genetic basis of sports performance, their 
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capability to predict future performance is very weak, if not non-existent (32). DTC 
companies grossly distort the power of these tests and their utility in athletic career 
planning – both in terms of de/selecting sports that an individual is apparently 
genetically suited to or not.  
 
4. ETHICS OF GENETICS-BASED TALENT IDENTIFICATION 
PROGRAMMES: PARENTAL DUTIES, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, BEST 
INTERESTS 
 
Athletic genetic tests are predicated on the assumption that an early intervention and 
steering from parents in a scientifically-guided direction can lead to future success. Is 
there anything morally different between more traditional programmes of talent 
identification and genetics-based programs? One key difference attends to perceptions 
as to their efficacy.  Genetics-based talent identification (TI) programmes are often 
thought  of as particularly powerful because of the exceptional “deterministic” status 
still accorded to genetic information by the public.(11) 
 
Breitbach et al in their review of genetics-based talent identification programmes 
(4:1493) argue that “the procedure of a TI-based selection remains ethically 
questionable because the applied tests and the unreliable extrapolation of future 
success exhibit false positive and false negatives” which is consistent with the 
position developed here. Yet they conclude that “many deficiencies in the current TI 
system and research have gained attention, and efforts are being made to overcome 
them”.(4)  This is a laudable yet flawed conclusion since it conflates scientific or 
technical deficiencies with conceptual ones.  While there are technical deficiencies 
that better designed methodologies will improve upon, there is a fundamental failure 
to acknowledge the limited value of TI predictions faced with the contingency of 
factors that comprise athletic success, and the contingencies of a human life over the  
long haul from childhood to adulthood. Moreover, discussion of talent identification 
often neglects deeper conceptual and ethical issues about child-parent/guardian 
(hereafter “parents”) relations, which can be framed variously in terms of ethical 
concepts such as duties, rights, interests.   
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Moral and legal rights are thought typically to be negative or positive; protective or 
promotive of the wellbeing of an individual. It is widely held that rights generate 
duties in relevant others to do or forbear specific things.  According to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (31), children are accorded a wide 
range of specific rights. Article 3.1 notes “In all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.”(31) How these concepts are framed against parental rights 
and duties is a key issue for talent identification programmes since, children do not 
typically not enjoy equal status in decision-making.  This disparity is justified on the 
grounds that they do not possess the relevant degree of rational autonomy or, in legal 
terms, “competence”. 
 
Moreover, given the disparity of knowledge and power between parents and children, 
there must be critical discussions about parental rights and duties, and about what it 
means to be a good (sports)parent (12). These discussions must be temporally framed: 
they necessarily involve evaluating what it is ethically justifiable now with an eye 
towards the consequences of these actions for the future, the opportunities they open 
up, and those which are foreclosed by decisions and actions taken in the present.  
 
In an important contribution to the philosophical literature on children’s rights 
Feinberg originally coined the term “right to an open future” (ROF).(10) as a subset 
of child-related rights that were distinct from adult rights. Rather than expressing a 
general adult right to determine one’s choices and projects, the child’s rights he 
argued related to the adult that they would become.  It was thus called a “right in 
trust” where parents act as fiduciaries for their child(ren). Feinberg’s discussion arose 
from a US Supreme Court decision that permitted the Amish community to end their 
children’s public schooling at age 14 years of age, before the end of compulsory 
schooling at 16. Children, he argued to the contrary, should be allowed to choose their 
own conception of the good later in life when they are able to exercise their 
autonomy, and parents have a duty not to force upon them life choices that would 
prevent them from exercising that autonomy at a later date.  
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What has this got to do with genetics-based talent identification programmes? It has 
been suggested that DTC genetic tests infringe on the child’s ROF by limiting the 
opportunities that would be open to child to only one sporting future.(22) But this 
objection is only a part of the ethical evaluation of ROF and genetic testing.  Consider 
a real-life example, the case of Andre Agassi. Both he and his older siblings were 
subjected to a highly focused and controlling education by their father.(1) Agassi 
became a world-renowned tennis player. Insofar as Agassi was brought up in the 
Bollettieri academy, where curricular options were especially narrow, and youngsters 
subjected to a highly controlled environment, should we conclude that his ROF were 
overridden? Our present perspective might justify in consequential terms the 
infringement of his ROF but this would not extend this to his elder siblings who failed 
to become successful tennis players. 
 
 
The idea of an ROF is not without criticisms. Might parental child-rearing aimed at a 
“smorgasbord” of activities not also be detrimental to the promise of a child’s 
particular talents?(17,5) Does ROF count against all forms of early specialization, 
which are necessarily exclusionary because of opportunity costs? The idea of a 
neutral, non-committal, openness to the future also fails to capture the palpable fact 
that some options are not equally valuable, nor necessarily combinable; nor realizable 
at the same life stage, but that they are still capable of rational evaluation.(12) It also 
fails to capture the widely held view that child-rearing children practices cannot avoid 
significant recognition of parental values. 
   
ROF, like Best Interests decisions, made by a third party seem to comprise both 
subjective and objective elements.(16)  Note, however, that if all choices are merely 
capable of subjective evaluation then, logically speaking, none are superior or 
inferior; they are merely matters of taste. Yet if the possibility of objective evaluation 
as to which choices may be preferable exists (e.g. more time spent on maths tuition, 
video game playing, paid employment, voluntary work, athletics, or piano lessons), 
then complex choices about uncertain and unpredictable futures can be justified by 
more than mere preferences.  But neither ROF nor BI models provide us with a 
decision-procedure for specific guidance. 
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Just like adults, the child’s development towards the good life is essentially both 
temporal, and social. Wellbeing is built within webs of relationships and contexts in 
which sense or meaning can be experienced.  The way in which parental preferences 
become acquiesced to, endorsed, or rejected by maturing children and adolescents 
points both to the need to understand decisions re ROF or BI in a wider nexus of 
interests and desires.  It seems that ROF is a static concept that does not adequately 
encapsulate the long-term, future selves, dimension of wellbeing.(29)  
 
To a certain extent, decisions affecting the wellbeing of children and adults pans out 
in media res.  That is to say, in the thick of things.  We plan forward, guess- 
estimating all manner of variables.  Ethical evaluations must be made both ex ante 
(according to our responsible choices and predictions) and ex post. As put by 
Kierkeegard, life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forward.(15) 
It is this living forward, and the wellbeing of the child as she develops into an adult 
that must be foregrounded when considering the use of non-therapeutic genetic 
testing. 
 
We argue that the ethical emphasis needs to be put on the parental decision in light of 
the present tense, on the wellbeing on the child now, not on (potential) ex post 
justifications in hindsight on the basis of the consequences. Only a holistic approach 
can do justice to these questions by addressing the wellbeing of the child in a 
temporal manner and would address wider questions of what a good (sports)parent 
ought do to help the child flourish, and how it would balance the future-agent focus 
necessary to nurture talent with the wellbeing of the child in the present. 
 
5. Discussion: genetic tests and athletic futures? 
 
The ethical issues with genetic based TI are not limited to the unreliable extrapolation 
of future success. Even counterfactually granting predictive value to genetic tests for 
talent identification does not rule out the ethical issues we have raised. Genetic tests 
for talent identification purposes rests upon substantial assumptions about the 
envisaged future.  This limitation is intrinsic to prediction and not something that can 
be eradicated since what one is predicting is, in part, the shape of a human life.  What 
we do now affects the future for good or worse: choices alter futures.  And this is 
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amplified in the case of children and adolescents in the first phases of such a life. 
None of this amounts to the conclusion that we should not use genetic tests, nor that 
we should.  How we approach the initial question responsibly depends on our 
understanding of the terms of reference, the reliability and validity of the tests, and, 
crucially, a range of ethical considerations about choice, consent, and responsibility 
for the future wellbeing of those whose life plans or prospectuses are neither fully 
formed nor informed. 
 
DTC-genetic tests to identify talent in sport do not predict future sports performance 
while can “discourage parents and children from pursuing a particular sport interest if 
the genetic test does not confirm specific talents”, raising the very real possibility that 
parents and children may make “ life-decisions based on mistaken beliefs about the 
relevance of the tests”. (7) This supports the recent guidelines by British Journal of 
sports Medicine to discourage the use of such tests. (32) 
 
 
Critically, public discussion needs to be opened on the meaning and value of sport 
and of physical activity in childhood and adolescence as compared to the meaning of 
sport in adult and especially professional athletics,(7) which is another source of 
pressures towards early specialization, and the role that sports medicine and 
technology ought to play mediating such information. Childhood and adolescent sport 
should not become so ‘goal-directed’ an activity that it aims exclusively at victory, or 
the early professionalization of children, as elite sport currently is.  Most of the values 
and benefits of sports may be had by the modestly competent as well as the elite. 
Ruling out possible sources of meaning and wellbeing on the grounds of genetic 
ineptitude early in the life of a child is scientifically irresponsible, and ethically 
culpable. 
 
Both ROF and BI judgments work against choosing a narrowly athletic path for any 
child that is not exceptionally athletically talented, the identification of which (i) only 
reveals itself after some years of play and sports experience; and (ii) is not reducible 
to genetic tests. Current genetic tests for ‘talent’ do not predict aptitude or success to 
any significant degree and are therefore only marginally pertinent and potentially very 
misleading for talent identification.(7) Sports physicians and health care professionals 
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involved in sport medicine should therefore not promote such tests, and should 
discourage parents or others who have accessed DTC tests to act on the basis of the 
results of the tests. Moreover, state-sponsored programmes such as those mentioned at 
the beginning of this paper should also be the subject of critical scientific and ethical 
scrutiny. 
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